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DEFENDANT AS A WITNESS
IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
At common law an interested party in a court proceeding was
not a competent witness in his own behalf. The basis for disqualifying parties was a notion that the temptation to falsify
was too great for the average witness to resist. Any party, therefore, who had any interest whatsoever in the case could not
testify. A riper wisdom and experience, however, brought to
light the fact that it was better not to close the mouths of interested parties in court proceedings, and statutes were subsequently passed in practically all the English-speaking jurisdictions that would allow an interested party to be a competent
witness, and consequently a defendant in a criminal case could
testify and be a witness at his own trial.'
In reviewing the laws of the several jurisdictions of the
English speaking countries, the states of the United States,
and the practice in United States Federal Courts, one can readily
ascertain that the defendant can testify and be a competent
witness in a criminal proceeding in all the jurisdictions with the
exception of Georgia. The question of whether or not defendant
is a competent witness is amply set forth in the United States
Code which is worded similarly to statutes in jurisdictions that
1. ENGLISH CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 1898, St. 61 and 62, Vict. c.36;
CANADA DRAFT EVIDENCE ACT.1938, § 3; 62 STAT. 833 (1948), 18 U.S.C.
3481 (Supp. 1951) ; ALA. CoDE, 1940, Tit. 15, § 305; ARIz. CODE ANN.,
1939, § 44-2704; ARK. STAT. ANN., 1947, § 43-2018; CAL. PENAL CODE,
1949, § 593.02; MISS. CODE ANN., 1942, § 1692; Mo. REVISED STAT., 1929,
§ 7868; REVISED CODE OF DEL., 1915. § 4690; FLA. STAT. ANN., 1949, §
90.05; IDAHO CODE, 1949, § 19-3003; SMITH-HURD ILL. ANN. STAT.,
1937, c. 38, § 734; IND. BURNS STAT., 1933, § 9-1603; IOWA CODE, 1946,
§ 622.3; KAN. GEN. STAT., 1949, § 62-1420; Ky. REVISED STAT., 1948,
§ 455.090; LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC., 1932, § 461; ME. REVISED STAT.,
1930, § 115; MD. ANN. CODE, 1924, Art. 5, § 1; ANN. LAWS OF MASS.,
1933, c. 233, § 20; MICH. COMPILED LAWS, 1948, § 617.63; MINN. STAT.,
1949, § 593.02; MISS CODE ANN., 1942. § 1692; Mo. REVISED STAT., 1929,
§ 3689; MONT. REVISED CODE, 1935, § 12177; REVISED STAT. OF NEBR.,
1943, § 29-2011; NEV. LAWS, 1929, § 10959; N. H. PUBLIC LAWS, 1926,
§ 2:97-10; N. M. STAT. ANN., 1929, § 45-504; MCKINNEY'S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF N. Y. ANN., 1945, § 393; N. J. REVISED STAT., 1939, §

2:97-1; GEN. STAT. OF N. C., 1943, § 8-54; N. D. COMPILED LAWS, 1913,
§ 10837; PACE'S OHIO GEN. CODE ANN., 1945, § 13444-2; OKLA. STAT.,
1941, § 22-701; ORE. CODE, 1930, § 13-929; PA. PURDEN'S STAT., 1930,
St. 1887, § 1, Tit. 19, § 681; R. I. GEN. LAWS, 1938, C.538, § 11; S. C.
CODE, 1932, § 1011; S. D. CODE, 1939, § 34.3633; TENN. CODE, 1932. §
9782; TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC., 1936, Art. 710; UTAH CONST., 1895,
Art. 1, § 12; VT. PUBLIC LAWS, 1934, § 2383; VA. CODE, 1950, § 19-238;

WASH. CONST., 1889, Art. 1, § 22; W. VA. CODE, 1949, § 5731; WIs.
STAT., 1947, § 325.13; WYO. COMPILED LAWS, 1945, § 10-1201.
2. An act was proposed at the 1952 session of the Georgia General Assembly that would have allowed a delendant to become a competent witness, but in spite of the backing of the Georgia Bar Association the
proposed act failed to be reported out of committee.
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allow a criminal defendant to testify under oath: 62 STAT.
833(948) I8 U.S.C. 3481 (Supp. i95i). "In trials of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United
States . . . the person charged shall, at his own request, be a
competent witness." The jurisdictional rules that will allow a
defendant to be a competent witness are uniform in the holding
that the defendant must volunteer to become a witness and that
compulsion or coercion cannot be used in any degree, and the
defendant must be informed that he can remain silent and no
inference shall he drawn from his failure to testify.3
In all criminal trials in Georgia the prisoner shall have the
right to make to the court and jury such statement in the case
as he may deem proper in his defense. It shall not be under
oath, and shall have such force only as the jury may think
proper to give it. The jury may believe the defendant's statement in preference to the sworn testimony in the case, and the
defendant shall not be compelled to answer any questions on
cross-examination should he decline to answer.4 The defendant
may, however, consent to be cross-examined, but this cross-examination cannot be under oath because the law does not allow
a defendant to be placed under oath even with his consent and
neither the state nor the defendant can waive this law prohibiting the defendant from being sworn. 5 Comment by counsel
may, however, be made upon defendant's unsworn statements
made to the jury.
The review of the laws of the various jurisdictions has conclusively shown that the accused in a criminal proceeding can
be a competent witness in his own behalf; the different codes
however, have different rules in regard to the degree of crossexamination. As to precisely what position the defendant is in
once he elects to take the stand and the counsel for the prosecution begin their cross-examination is one of the larger if not the
largest aspects of defendant's taking the stand. This aspect has
been treated differently by the several jurisdictions, but generally its mode of treatment will fall into one of the following
categories :' (I) The voluntary taking of the stand is a waiver
as to all facts whatsoever, including those which merely affect
credibility. (2) The waiver extends to all matters relevant to
the issue, meaning thereby to exclude collateral matter, i.e.,
facts merely affecting credibility. (3) The accused may be
cross-examined only as to subjects already dealt with in his direct
examination. (4) The waiver extends to no other criminal acts
3. State v. Chisnell. 36 W.Va. 659, 15 S.E. 412 (1892).
4. GA. CODE. 1933, § 27-405.
5. Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 5 S.E.2d 340 (1939).
6. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2276 (3d ed. 1940).
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than the one precisely charged. The defendant therefore, must
suffer the consequences if he exercises his option and decides to
take the stand and become a competent witness.
The voluntary taking the stand and its resultant waiver can
be supported on the ground that the privilege protects the
accused against any form of compulsory disclosure as a witness;
consequently, its waiver abandons any right to refuse to answer
questions as a witness. The second rule is based upon the fact
that defendant was not obligated to testify and if he does testify
he exonerates himself and denies the commission of the offense
charged and therefore he is subject to cross-examination as
the necessary result of his assuming the position of a witness,
and consequently, if he discloses part he must disclose the whole
in relation to the subject matter about which he has answered
in part.7 The third rule, which holds that the waiver allows the
prosecution to ask questions pertaining to the issues about
which questions were asked upon direct examination only, is
practically the same as the second rule, and the literal effect
of the third rule is to limit the doctrine of waiver to the subject
of the direct examination, but the subject of direct examination,
properly construed, is the whole fact of guilt or innocence, and
hence the topic of cross-examination could readily range over
all relevant facts except those facts that merely affect credibility. The fourth rule, that the waiver extends to no other
criminal act, is presumably grounded in the reasoning that an
accused who takes the stand may fairly be asked to tell all he
knows that is revelant, and since the prosecution can in any
event, by other witnesses prove the former offenses, it is difficult
to see why the same act cannot be proved by defendant's own
testimony, without unfair prejudice.'
The rules vary somewhat as to the mode of treating the
defendant's character once he is called as a witness. In England
the accused who is called as a witness cannot be asked any
question tending to show that he has committed, or been convicted of, or been charged with any offense other than that with
which he is then charged, unless, inter alia, such offense is admissible to show he is guilty of the offense charged, or evidence has been given or questions asked tending to establish
his own good character.' One would gather from the English
7. State v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234 (1875).
8. State v. Bartness, 33 Ore. 110. 54 Pac. 167 (1898).
9. The English rule is apparently based on the common law doctrine that
everyone is innocent until proven guilty, and from this beneficent principle comes the rule that the general bad character of one charged
with a particular crime may not be shown unless the accused himself
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view that the defendant has the option as to whether or not
his character will be put in evidence. If the defendant decides
to put his good character forward then he has left himself open
for the probing questions of the prosecution as to his bad
character.
The Canada Evidence Act of I893,"° provides that a witness
may be asked whether he has been convicted of any offense, and
if he does not admit that he has been convicted, the conviction
may be proved against him. It has accordingly been held that
this subjects the accused to the same liability with regard to
cross-examination as to previous convictions even though he
has not given evidence of good character. 1 No valid justification has been given for the rule, and it has not escaped notice
that such evidence may have the effect of prejudicing the position of accused with the jury. 2
The prevailing rule in the United States is that the prosecution may not initially attack the defendant's character in a
criminal proceeding. However, after a defendant has attempted
to show his good character in his own aid, the prosecution may
in rebuttal offer evidence of the defendant's bad character. 3
The reason for this rule is that if the accused having a bad
character, misleads the court, the false impression should be removed by the prosecution going into the issue of defendant's
character. The rule therefore that prevails in the United States
is the same as the English rule and both the English and United
States rules are based on the common law approach to a defendant's character. 4
The question of comment upon defendant's failure to testify
has been treated differently in different jurisdictions. In England the judge is allowed to comment upon the failure of the
defendant to testify but Crown counsel cannot. 5 The Canadian
Code prohibits any comment by either judge or counsel.' 6 The
rule that prevails in the United States jurisdictions is that
defendant's failure to submit himself as a witness shall not
create any presumption against him nor be the subject of comrnent by counsel nor judge, and any comment whatsoever is
chooses to put his character in issue; and it is urged that this settled

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

rule will be violated by allowing the prosecution to show that a defendant on trial is wanting in truthfulness, as that must necessarily,
to some extent at least, involve the matter of general character.
56 VICT., c. 31.
Rex. v. D'Aoust (1902), 3 D.L.R. 563, 5 Can. Cr. Cas. 407.
12 CAN. B. REV. 519 (1934).
Romes v. Commonwealth, 164 Ky. 334, 175 S.W. 669 (1915).
See Note 7, supra.
ENGLISH CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 1898, supra, Note 1.
13 CAN. B. REV. 336 (1935).
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forbidden in the presence of the jury with regard to the refusal of defendant to take the stand and become a competent
witness." If the silence of the defendant is permitted to raise
adverse inferences against him, and therefore the subsequent
comment by a prosecuting counsel, the privilege extended by the
option of taking the stand or remaining silent would become a
coercive influence to take the witness stand, with all the temptation to perjury arising from his vital interest in the case, accentuated by a searching cross-examination.' In Georgia however,
comment may be made upon the unsworn statement of the defendant, which could be construed as being contrary to the
prevalent rule that will not allow comment to be made upon
an accused's failure to testify because the defendant's statement is not testimony in Georgia criminal proceedings. 9
There has been much criticism leveled at the fact that defendant is not treated as other witnesses with regard to selfincriminating evidence when he once volunteers to take the
stand. The view seems to be that the privilege of not taking the
stand allowed the accused to enjoy the right of not having
a single question asked him and for this reason no relevant fact
could be inquired about that would tend to incriminate him,2"
and, consequently, on this very hypothesis his voluntary offer
of testimony upon any fact is a waiver at to all other relevant
facts. It-follows, therefore, that he has signified his waiver to
the privilege against self-incrimination. The prohibition in the
United States Constitution is against compelling an accused
person to become a witness against himself, 2' but if he consents
to become a witness in a criminal action in which he is a defendant, voluntarily and without any compulsion, and he gives
evidence which bears against himself, the giving of evidence results from the defendant's voluntary act of becoming a witness,
and not from compulsion. The accused's own act is the pri17. Garrett v. State, 25 Ariz. 508, 219 Pac. 593 (1923). There is, however,
a rule much in evidence that will allow comment to be made upon defendant's failure to become a witness. PAGE'S OHIO GEN. CODE ANN.,
1945, § 13444-3. Goodman v. Sapp, 102 N.C. 477, 9 S.E. 483 (1889).
See also, Adamson v. California, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 322 U.S. 46 (1947),
where the United States Supreme Court held that a California law
was constitutional which would allow comment to be made upon defendant's failure to take the stand as a witness.
18. Turner v. State, 238 Ala. 352, 191 So. 396 (1939).
19. See Note 5, supra.
20. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2260 (3d ed. 1940).
21. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
that no person shall be compelled to furnish evidence against himself.
The ruling, however, of the United States Supreme Court in Adamson
v. California, Note 17, supra, is to the effect that a state law compelling a person to be a witness against himself in a state criminal
proceeding violates no United States constitutional guarantee.
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mary cause and if it was voluntary, he has no reason to complain.22
There are certain drawbacks to legislation that allows a defendant to testify in a criminal proceeding, and this discussion
would not be complete without mentioning a few of the more
important drawbacks to precedure rules that would allow a
defendant in a criminal case to be a competent witness. One of
the more important aspects is that such legislation would place
the defendant under a moral duress, compelling him to become
a witness, under the penalty, if he declines, of the most damaging
suspicions on the part of the jury, as well as the public.23 The
jury is likely to infer from the defendant's silence that he must
be guilty or he would have taken the stand and sworn to his innocence, regardless of what instructions the judge might have
given them with regard to the inference of any guilt from
defendant's silence. If on the other hand defendant does take
the stand the jury will say that if he is guilty of the crime of
which he is accused he will not hesitate to add perjury to it,
and on top of all this the average defendant in a criminal
case is unaccustomed to public speaking, and by no means in
the habit of arranging his ideas in logical sequence, or expressing them in apt terms, and the strain of cross-examination
by men skilled in the art of cross-examination and well learned
in the law could very easily cause the defendant to make
omissions that could be construed as a confession of guilt. 4
CONCLUSION

The rule that will not allow a defendant to be a competent
witness in a criminal proceeding was a very practical rule in its
day, but in modern times when the courts are confronted with
the professional criminal it would seem to be imperative that the
prosecution have every means possible under our democratic
form of government to cope with these breakers of the law.
The enforcement of the criminal law is not a game for which
rewards are offered for skillful manuevers. The criminal is, in
most cases, anything but a sportsman, and he will use every
trick or device to cover up his act and escape the consequences.
Therefore the prosecution must be armed to overcome such
shrewdness and expose the criminals whenever possible, consequently the prosecutor's hands should not be tied by legislation
that is not necessary where the defendant can be adequately
protected without it.25
S. DAN PACK
22.
23.
24.
25.

Connors v. People, 50 N.Y. 240 (1872).
22 CENT. L.J. 314 (1886).
State v. Maynard, 19 Nev. 284, 9 Pac. 514 (1886).
14 CAN. B. REV. 424 (1936).

